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THE CHOICE OF LAW CLAUSE IN CONTRACTS
BETWEEN PARTIES OF DEVELOPING AND
DEVELOPED NATIONS
I. INTRODUCTION
Trade between developed and developing countries continues to
expand as developed countries seek natural resources and labor-
intensive products and developing countries seek technologically
advanced products. Though it would seem to be a situation satis-
fying mutual needs, problems are often rife, particularly in con-
tract negotiations. One area of concern to international lawyers is
the choice of law clause, which indicates a body of law to govern
the contract in the event of legal problems between the parties. In
negotiating an international contract, parties should consider all
legal systems available before selecting a particular law to govern
their contract.
This Note considers the available systems of law from which a
choice of law can be made in a private international contract be-
tween individuals of developed and developing countries, with
special emphasis on contracts between parties from the United
States and Latin America. Factors influencing the choice of law
clauses are considered and their influence upon economic relations
between developed and developing countries are discussed. Prop-
erly employed, the choice of law clause can be an important com-
ponent in narrowing the political and economic gap between
developed and developing countries.
II. THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC CONTEXT
A. North-South Relations
The term "North-South relations" was coined during the late
1950s by Sir Oliver Franks, former British Ambassador to the
United States, as a reference to relations between developed and
developing nations.' During that time, the extreme socioeconomic
disparities between industrial and agrarian societies were
brought to light. Awareness of the problems increased as
developed economies continued to expand, while developing
economies failed to grow at a proportional rate. In many cases,
developing nations underwent further economic decline, which
lowered standards of living, defeated social expectations, and
L. GORDON, INTERNATIONAL STABILITY AND NORTH-SOUTH RELATIONS 6 (1978).
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troubled political relations with developed nations. Numerous
scholars have attributed this economic degeneration to the
abusive behavior of developed nations, which exploited their
superior commercial bargaining power to the detriment of
developing economies. In order to place developing nations on an
equal bargaining basis with the developed world, demands for a
New International Economic Order (NIEO) evolved, with a quest
for guidelines for international relations based on equality and
nondiscriminatory treatment.! These standards were to be met
through preferential treatment; "developed countries generally
grant preferences and developing countries are the prime
beneficiaries of such preferential treatment."3 One proposed
method of granting preferences is through a reconsideration of
the present use of the choice of law clause in private contracts.
B. Importance of choice of law clauses
A fairly negotiated choice of law clause reflects the reasonable
expectations of the contracting parties, contributes to their
amicable relations, and assures predictable litigation results."
Generally, the choice of law in the contract will govern questions
of validity and performance5 because courts are inclined to uphold
an express contract clause.' Private parties from the developed
world have used this premise to their advantage' by employing
standardized form contracts in which the choice of law clause
' The major United Nations actions proclaiming the NIEO are: the Declaration of the
Establishment of a New International Economic Order, G.A. Res. 3201, 6 Special Session
U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No.1) 3, U.N. Doc. A/1955 (1974); and the Charter of Economic Rights
and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR 50, U.N. Doc. A/Res/3281 (XXIX)
(1975). For an analysis of the standard of preferential treatment invoked by the NIEO, see
18 HARV. INT'L L.J. 109 (1977). For a comprehensive discussion on the NIEO and its implica-
tions for international law, see White, A New International Economic Order, 24 INT'L &
COMp. L.Q. 542 (1975).
18 HARV. INT'L L.J. 109, 117 (1977).
Entrepreneurs in developed countries use three basic methods of investment
strategies in developing countries: first, investment in an industry of a developing country;
second, investment through a licensing agreement; third, investment by the export of goods
to developing countries, and conversely by the import of goods from developing countries.
When referring to a choice of law clause in a contract, unless otherwise stated, application
is to any of these investment strategies, all of which would require contracts and all of
which should include a choice of law clause.
I G. DELAUME, TRANSNATIONAL CONTRACTS: APPLICABLE LAW AND THE SETTLEMENT OF
DISPUTES, Part I, Booklet 2, Party Autonomy and Express Stipulations of Applicable
Law(1980).
6 Id.
' Id. at 1.
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found at the end of the contract8 stipulates that the law of the ex-
porting country will govern.9 Such standardized form contracts
are covenient because of the time and expense involved in
negotiating a new contract with each trading partner. However,
since they are not the products of negotiation, and often the result
of unequal bargaining power, these contracts do not always reflect
the parties' reasonable expectations. Therefore, parties in
developing countries seek to avoid their use and opt instead for
negotiated contracts. Developing countries argue that they have
no alternative to accepting form contracts with unfavorable choice
of law clauses because of their lack of bargaining power. This
trading disadvantage is due in part to the admittedly insufficient
technological and managerial capacities of developing countries,
and in part to the monopolization of world trade by industrialized
countries."
In addition to the moral questions raised by the maintenance of
such inequities, there are the practical problems inherent in at-
tempting to bind national governments -which often own and
operate the transnational enterprises of developing nations-to
foreign laws, which take no notice of their socioeconomic in-
terests." Many governments of developing nations have attemp-
ted to counter the developed nations' preferences for their own
commercial regulations with government contracts specifically
providing that all local remedies be exhausted before contractual
issues can be submitted to a foreign court. For example, the Calvo
Clause, stipulated in the constitutions of many Latin American
countries, narrowly defines contractual freedom in state con-
tracts.'" However, where only private enterprises are parties to
8 Maw, Conflict Avoidance in International Contracts, in INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS:
CHOICE OF LAW AND LANGUAGE (W. Reese ed. 1962).
9Id.
0 THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER: THE NORTH-SOUTH DEBATE 1 (J. Bhagwati
ed. 1977). Problems have occurred with all three investment strategies: (1) investment in an
industry of a developing country has resulted in import substitution and an influx of
peasants into the cities in search of factory jobs causing overcrowding and increased pover-
ty in urban areas; (2) licensing has generally involved technology transfers, in which many
problems currently exist; and (3) exporting has generally been of raw materials rather than
finished products, thus depriving the developing country of further revenue from the
manufacturing process.
" Folsom, Choice-of-Law Provisions in Latin American Contracts, in INTERNATIONAL
CONTRACTS: CHOICE OF LAW AND LANGUAGE 61 (W. Reese ed. 1962).
" For example, the Peruvian Constitution states, "in every state contract with
foreigners, or in the concessions which grant them in the latter's favour, it must be express-
ly stated that they will submit to the laws and tribunals of the Republic and renounce all
diplomatic claims." Art. 17.
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an international contract, the superior commercial position en-
joyed by parties from developed nations generally enables them
to dictate whichever choice of law they favor.13
III. COMPONENTS IN THE SELECTION PROCESS
A. Party Autonomy
The negotiation of a choice of law clause into a contract is mean-
ingless unless a court having proper jurisdiction is willing to en-
force it. Not all courts grant the contracting parties autonomy to
choose the law to govern the contract. "Party autonomy" is the
doctrine that allows the intention of the parties to govern validity
of a contract.14 Although the United States and Great Britain em-
brace this view, few developing countries encourage such exten-
sive contractual freedom. Party autonomy is beneficial in that it
allows the parties complete freedom to select a law best suited to
the needs of their particular relationship. It may become objec-
tionable, however, if it enables the parties to circumvent govern-
mental regulation and policy."5
Complete party autonomy is not in the best interest of develop-
ing nations due to their insufficient bargaining power vis-a-vis
developed nations. Allowing firms from developed nations to
select from any available rule of law often results in choices that
are the most economically feasible, but nevertheless are unaccept-
able to the developing world's socioeconomic interests. Other
arguments posited against party autonomy are that foreigners
who avail themselves of foreign markets should also submit
themselves to foreign laws, and that foreigners often have no
understanding of other legal systems."6
On the other hand, several reasons are advanced in support of
party autonomy. First, trade between nations is unlike a domestic
transaction; in keeping with its international character, regulation
of trade and trade-related disputes should not be held to one
"3 Bhagwati, supra note 10.
" Naidu, On the Choice of Law in Contracts: The Doctrine of Autonomy of Parties, 13
INDIAN J. INT'L L. 594 (1973).
"5 Beale, What Law Governs the Validity of a Contract? (pt. 3), Theoretical and Practical
Criticisms of the Authorities, 23 HARv. L. REV. 260 (1909-10). Beale was the reporter for the
first Restatement of Conflict of Laws and adhered to the vested rights theory; it is natural,
therefore, that he should be opposed to party autonomy.
" Roffe, Reflections on Current Attempts to Revise International Legal Structures:
The North-South Dialogue-Clash of Values and Concepts, Contradictions and Com-
promises, 9 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 559, 566 (1979).
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specific legal system. The legal system chosen should be the one
best suited for each particular contract." Second, national courts
show a preference for their domestic law"s and "could be biased in
favour of nationals, discriminating against foreign parties" if they
are forced to use foreign commercial codes.' 9 And, third, a "lack of
trust by developed countries in the legal systems of developing
countries, particularly where the systems are new," leads to selec-
tion of the law of a developed nation."
In state contracts, the controversy of party autonomy centers
largely on the concept of national sovereignty and freedom to
assert a law beneficial to this end. In private contracts, however,
the issue concerns the relative bargaining power of each party
and the furtherance of economic goals, with each side promoting
its own interest. With the exception of certain natural resources
in large demand and short supply, the developed countries have
prevailed in this contest of bargaining strength and continue to
assert unfettered party autonomy."
B. Available Systems of Law
Where the courts recognize the autonomy of the parties to
negotiate a system of law that will govern their contract, the con-
tracting parties may effectively agree on what system best suits
their purposes. Their choice can include: (1) the traditional prin-
ciples of international law, ie., lex mercatoria; (2) the private legal
system of a state that has codified the traditional principles; or (3)
a uniform codification of a private legal system.
1. Lex Mercatoria
Classical private international law is based on the assumption
that any international contract that is not between states is to be
governed by a state's private law 2 and not by international law.
However, many courts have found it difficult to adhere to this doc-
trine because of divergent legal systems. International merchants,
SId. at 566-67.
" Rapsomanikis, Frustration of Contract in International Trade Law and Comparative
Law, 18 DuQ. L. REV. 551, 601 (1980).
19 Roffe, supra note 16, at 567.
20 Id.
" This Note does not discuss trade of such resources. That area requires specialized
treatment because of its unique characteristics and problems.
' This doctrine evolved from the ruling in the Serbian Loans case [1929] P.C.I.J., ser. A,
No. 20/21, as referred to in E. LANGEN. TRANSNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LAW 2 (1973).
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therefore, deveioped customary practices in their international
contract relations to alleviate problems with the traditional doc-
trine;13 courts, in turn, began to accept these practices as a
substitute for codified law. One customary practice of merchants
that has evolved is use of the standardized form contract specify-
ing all obligations, and in effect, substituting the law of the con-
tract for that of a legal system." Based primarily on customary
practices, the lex mercatoria is rarely used today as the sole
source of law for a contract, but instead is used in conjunction
with a uniform and/or private law as stipulated in the contract.
Developing countries are hesitant to rely on the lex
mercatoria,which evolved before they had entered international
trade. One author states the dilemma succinctly:
Developing countries, which have repeatedly mistrusted
classical principles of international law because these were
established at a time when they were not full-fledged members
of the international community, have expressed reliance on
traditional instruments of international law, such as treaties or
other forms of legally binding instruments. Developed countries,
on the other hand, have manifested preference for voluntary in-
struments that do not have a legally binding character. 5
In the context of today's multi-billion dollar international transac-
tions, it would be imprudent to base a major portion of a contract
on something not legally binding and so evanescent as lex mer-
catoria. Although customary practices or trade usage should be
considered in certain situations, in choosing the law to govern ma-
jor portions of a contract, other sources should be considered.
2. Private Law
Private law is that part of a legal system dealing with in-
dividuals, and is opposed to public law which involves the state in
its role as sovereign." Even in the face of complete party
autonomy, most legal systems do place some restrictions on the
selection of law governing private contracts. A brief survey of the
23 Berman & Kaufman, The Law of International Commercial Transactions (Lex Mer-
catoria, 19 HARV. INT'L L.J. 221, 223 (1978).
24 Id. at 231.
21 Roffe, supra note 16, at 567.
" The United States uses the term "conflict of laws" in the same context as many other
countries use the term "private international law."
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conflict of law rules governing contracts in the United States,
Argentina, Brazil, and Colombia reveals such restrictions.
a. United States
The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, published in
1971, is the codification of conflicts rules in the United States. As
with most codifications concerning choice of law in contracts, the
Restatement provides guidelines to govern when no effective
choice is made by the parties, as well as parameters for determin-
ing the suitability of a choice made by the parties. Where no effec-
tive choice is made by the parties, section 188 of the Restatement
provides that the law of the state having the most significant rela-
tionship to the issue is to govern that issue.2" Where a choice has
been made by the parties, section 187 states that the choice will
be allowed to stand if the issue is one that could have been ex-
pressly provided for in the contract. The choice of law will be
upheld, even if the issue could not have been expressly provided
for in the contract with two qualifications: first, the law must have
a substantial relationship to the parties or to the transaction,
which in most cases would be the place of contracting or the place
of performance; second, the choice must not be contrary to the
public policy of a state whose interest is greater than that of the
state whose law was chosen.
Supplementing the Restatement are two Supreme Court cases:
MIS Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.,2" and Scherk v. Alberto-
Culver Co.' In both cases the Court held that a clause in an inter-
national contract, which has been negotiated in an arm's length
transaction, will be upheld regardless of whether the clause could
be found invalid under one party's legal system, unless a strong
27 In the absence of an effective choice of law provision, the Restatement requires con-
sideration of the following contacts in determining the place with the most significant rela-
tion and thus, the law applicable to an issue:
a. the place of contracting,
b. the place of negotiation of the contract,
c. the place of performance,
d. the location of the subject matter of the contract, and
e. the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of
business of the parties.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §188(2) (1971). These contacts are to be
evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue. Id.
" 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
2 Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
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reason for finding it invalid is present, such as "fraud, undue in-
fluence, or overweening bargaining power."30 Zapata and Scherk
involved a forum selection clause and an arbitration clause,
respectively, and in both cases, the Court ruled against the
private United States businesses involved in the litigation. These
precedents should apply to a choice of law clause dispute, dis-
abling a United States business from perfunctorily accepting
foreign law and then attempting to hide behind the protective
cloak of United States law in the event of litigation.
b. Argentina
Article 1205 of the Argentine Code provides that "contracts
made outside the territory of the Republic, shall be judged, with
respect to their validity or nullity, their nature and the obliga-
tions to which they give rise, by the law of the place in which they
were entered into. ' 31 If performance is intended in Argentines or
foreigners.2 However, a contract entered into in Argentina then
Argentine law governs the validity and performance regardless of
where it was signed or whether the parties are Argentina to be
performed elsewhere is governed by the law of the country of per-
formance. An express choice of law clause will be upheld if there
is a genuine connection between the governing law and if the con-
tract and the choice does not conflict with Argentine public
policy .,
c. Brazil
In the past, Brazil has sought to apply its law to virtually all
contracts touching its state, regardless of where they were
signed. 5 The law in Brazil today follows lex loci contractus for
both validity and performance, and a contract is deemed made at
the place of residence of the one who made the initial proposal.'
Where performance is in Brazil, however, the lex loci contractus
3 407 U.S. at 12. See also Delaume, What is an International Contract? An American
and a Gallic Dilemma, 28 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 258, 276-77 (1979).
"' Quoted in W. GOLDSCHMIDT & J. RODRIGUEZ-NOVAS, AMERICAN-ARGENTINE PRIVATE IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 50 (1966).
32 See R. SANGUINETTI, THE STATEMENT OF THE LAWS OF ARGENTINA, IN MATTERS AFFEC-
TING BUSINESS 84 (4th ed. 1975).
a GOLDSCHMIDT & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 31.
Id. at 52.




is not always applied by Brazilian courts," instead the contract is
bound by Brazilian law. Where both contracting and performance
are outside of Brazil, the stipulated law or lex loci is applied. 8
Currently, Brazil's national law neither authorizes nor prohibits
party choice. Thus, the extent of party autonomy cannot be ascer-
tained, although public policy can be used as an excuse to avoid an
express choice of law. 9
d. Colombia
Article 20 of the Colombian Civil Code provides:
(1) the validity of the contract depends on the local law of origin;
(2) the execution of its effect depends on the law of the place of
performance; (3) the execution in so far as it affects rights or in-
terests of Colombia must be adjusted to Colombian law,
regardless of what so ever may be the place of performance."
The parties choice of law will be allowed if it is not in conflict with
Colombian law even if the contract affects rights or interests of
Colombia.
The most prevalent restriction in many legal systems is that a
contract's choice of law clause will not be enforced where to do so
will violate some aspect of the forum's public policy. Apart from
this, each nation has its own version of how the law governing a
contract is to be selected in the event of no express stipulation
and to what extent an express stipulation must be followed. Be-
cause of divergent legal systems the laws of the country with
which one is contracting should be consulted before selecting the
law to govern the contract.
A major problem is encountered by those wishing to consult the
national laws of a foreign country before selecting a law to govern
their contract. There is a notable lack of easy access to translated
sources of laws, a condition that plagues both developed and de-
veloping countries. Even if accurate translations are available,
there is always the concern of how readily the codes are applied in
any given legal system and whether they are supplemented in the
foreign courts by other materials not readily accessible to the
37 Id.
3I& at 56.
31 Id. at 55.
," Reprinted in P. EDER, AMERICAN -COLOMBIAN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 59 (1956).
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researcher." This problem is twofold for a foreigner dealing with
United States law. First, the Restatement is not law per se but
rather a scholarly treatise promulgated by the American Law In-
stitute and supplemented by other scholarly works and case law
in the United States court system." Second, the United States is a
multi-legal system with a good deal of variance among each states'
system,43 thus putting an additional burden on foreigners who
might rely on the Restatement, or who will come in contact with
more than one state legal system. Thus, the foreigner will find it
virtually impossible to consult a single authoritative source of
United States trade law governing any given international tran-
saction.
3. Uniform Law
"If the customary law of international commercial transactions
were sufficiently well understood throughout the world, there
would be no need for national legislation embodying it; and if na-
tional legislation were sufficiently uniform throughout the world,
there would be no need for international codification."" Since
customary practices and national legislation have not proved suffi-
cient for all international transactions, there is a great need for in-
ternational codification. Many attempts have been made by
various interest groups to codify conflicts rules, but none have
proved totally successful. Two such attempts are the Bustamante
Code on Private International Law for regional application
drafted by the Organization of American States (OAS), and the
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods,
recently drafted by UNCITRAL.
a. Bustamante Code
The Bustamante Code on Private International Law was
" Note should be made here of the wide variance of accessibility to foreign legal
materials between a multinational and an exporter, and between a large exporter and a
medium and small exporter. A true multinational will have subsidiaries in foreign countries
and will.have easier access to bilingual legal assistance. The large exporter will have more
cause to invest in specialized legal expertise in the international law field as the volume of
exporting increases. The largest part of the burden falls on the small business or any size
business, market testing exports in a foreign market and aiming to keep export costs down
during the test period.
" Nadelman, Literature in Latin America on the Law of Conflict of Laws in the United
States, 4 INTER-AMERICAN L. REV. 103, 106 (1962).
41 Id. at 108.
" Berman & Kaufman, supra note 23, at 246.
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drafted in 1928 and ratified by fifteen Latin American states,
albeit six with general reservations." The pertinent sections con-
cerning choice of law are Articles 184, 185, and 186, which provide
that the law chosen by the parties should govern the contract. In
the event no law is chosen or the chosen law is ineffective, then
"the personal law common to the contracting parties shall be first
applied, and in the absence of such law there shall be applied that
of the place where the contract was concluded." 4 This allows com-
plete party autonomy in selection of the law to govern a contract
and law of the place of contracting in the absence of effective par-
ty selection. The Bustamante Code is an adequate codification;
apart from any substantive deficiencies, however, three obstacles
have stood in the path of useful application since its incipience.
The first obstacle is the notable absence of the United States as
a ratifying state. One source of this problem is the federal system
established by the United States Constitution, which leaves such
matters to the discretion of individual states.47 Additionally,
" Nadelman, The Need for Revision of the Bustamante Code on Private International
Law, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 782 (1971). Ratifying the Bustamante Code were Bolivia, Brazil,
Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Hon-
duras, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela. Bolivia, Costa Rica, Chile, Ecuador and El
Salvador had "general" reservations, "providing in substance that the Code rules will apply
only if they are not contrary to domestic law." Id. at 783. Argentina, Colombia, Mexico,
Paraguay and Uruguay signed but did not ratify the treaty. Of these, all but Mexico signed
with reservations. See INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL PROCEDURE:
AMERICAN CONTINENT 510 (L. Kos-Rabcewicz-Zubkowski ed. 1975).
40 Articles 184, 185 and 186 of the Bustamante Code provide:
Article 184. The interpretation of contracts should be effected, as a general
rule, in accordance with the law by which they are governed. However, when that
law is in dispute and should appear from the applied will of the parties, the
legislation provided for in that case in Arts. 186 and 187 shall be presumptively
applied, although it may result applying to the contract a different law as a conse-
quence of the interpretation of the will of the parties.
Article 185. Aside from the rules already established and those which may be
hereafter laid down for special cases, in contracts of accession, the law of one pro-
posing or preparing them is presumed to be accepted, in the absence of an ex-
pressed or implied consent.
Article 186. In all other contracts and in the case provided for in the preceding
article, the personal law common to the contracting parties shall be first applied,
and in the absence of such law there shall be applied that of the place where the
contract was concluded.
47 See Nadelman, supra note 45, at 788. The United States government, in a note dated
September 15, 1969, alluded to this problem, which was earlier mentioned in 1955 when a
study of the Bustamante Code, the Montevideo Treaties and the Restatement of the Law of
Conflicts was made. Id "The note meant to recall, it must be assumed, that legislative
jurisdiction over corporations lies with the States of the Union and not with the United
States Congress; according to the note, in such cases, United States acceptance of an inter-
national agreement is improbable." Id.
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"[flack of United States interest seems to be implied. Not having
been a participant in the preparation of the Code, the United
States is not likely ...to accept a revised Code either."'48 It is
therefore often urged that the Restatements not be considered in
the revision process.49 If the Code is completed and applied, this
isolationist view could prove detrimental to the United States
businessman, since "[ilnterests of American parties are in ever
growing numbers litigated in foreign courts. The United States
thus cannot be indifferent to the status of the rules on conflicts in
other countries."' Furthermore, although the Code is supposed to
apply only to states that are signatories of the Code, courts of
Code states tend to follow it in cases involving non-signatory coun-
tries. Thus, the Code can and does affect United States business
interests regardless of the fact that the United States is not a
signatory-an additional reason why participation in the Code's
revision could benefit the United States."
A second obstacle to the success of the Bustamante Code is the
virtual nullification of its benefits by the general reservations of
five states upon ratification. For example, Chile ratified the Code
with the following reservation: "If Chilean law is in conflict with
foreign statutes, the provisions of present and future Chilean
statutes shall prevail over the said Code in cases of disagreement
between the two." 2 The Code applies in Chile only where there is
no internal legislation, past, present, or future to the contrary. 3
Similarly, Costa Rica adopted the Code " 'with express reserva-
tion as to everything which may be in contradiction with the
legislation ... of Costa Rica' in force at the time of the subscrip-
tion 'and that which may be enacted in the future.' "I None of the
states that have ratified the Code with reservations have amend-
ed their internal legislation to be in accordance with the Code.55 If
the Bustamante Code is to have its intended effect, more
American states must be encouraged to adopt the Code with
fewer or no reservations.
" Id at 790.
" See, e.g., Nadelman, supra note 42, at 105-06, where the author warns against reliance
on the original Restatement.
5Id.
11 Nadelman, supra note 45, at 790.
' INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, supra note 45, at 128.
S Id
Id at 182.
Nadelman, supra note 45, at 783.
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The final obstacle to effective application of the Bustamante
Code is the narrow group of countries' laws which are codified
within it. When codifying conflict of laws rules, a broad, universal
approach encompassing many national laws is preferred to a nar-
row, regional approach encompassing the laws of a limited range
of countries." Regional codification may be easier since there are
fewer national laws to be reconciled and a regional code can be ap-
plied more simply, particularly within a smaller group such as the
OAS. Problems arise, however, where parties of a Code state
trade with parties of non-Code states, since as previously noted,
Code states tend to use the Code indiscriminately, much as the
United States uses the Restatement. This problem can be
alleviated by enlarging the group of countries involved in the
codification.
If the obstacles of the Bustamante Code are overcome it could
prove beneficial as a codification of international law. The primary
relevance of the Bustamante Code to North-South problems is
that it is a deliberate effort on behalf of developing countries of
Latin America and, as such, expresses their views on conflict of
laws. Developed countries should work with Latin American coun-
tries toward a revision that can satisfy both groups.
b. Draft Convention on International Contracts for the Sale
of Goods
In 1972, two Conventions, the Uniform Law on the Sale of
Goods (hereinafter ULIS), and the Uniform Law on the Formation
of Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (hereinafter ULF),
were ratified by various developed and developing countries, in-
cluding the United States. Together, the Conventions constitute
an attempt at international codification of rules governing the in-
ternational sale of goods and contract formation and include stipu-
lations on conflict rules within these specified boundaries. By
1977, relatively few countries had ratified either ULIS or ULF, in-
dicating problems with the Conventions. 7
Id. at 791.
5 Critics have found problems with ULIS and ULF. First, ULIS attempts to exclude
conflict issues by excluding rules of private international law for dispute resolution and
substituting the law of the Convention. G. DELAUME, supra note 5, at 22. Second, ULIS
defines an international sale only as the situation where goods are shipped from one state
to another, where offer and acceptance are in different states, or where delivery is to be
made in a different state from that of offer and acceptance. This often requires application
of ULIS in cases where another test should be used to determine choice of law.
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Because of the apparent inability of the Conventions to satisfy
the need for international codification, the United Nations Con-
ference on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods devel-
oped a unified draft based on ULF and ULIS, which was unani-
mously approved by the full Commission in 1978.8 Revised in the
1980 Vienna Convention, the Draft Convention was to be ratified
by September, 1981. The Draft Convention has limited applicabili-
ty. Article four states that "only the formation of the contract of
sale and the rights and obligations of the seller and buyer arising
from such a contract"59 are governed by the Convention. While the
Bustamante Code covers a wide range of conflict issues, its ter-
ritorial base is narrow. On the other hand, the Draft Convention
covers international conflicts in contract formation for the sale of
goods only, yet its territorial base is meant to be universal.
Scholars disagree as to which is the better approach, but applica-
tion by the business world probably will be the best measure of
success.
The ULIS excludes rules of private international law for dis-
pute resolution and substitutes the law of the Convention." This
approach is grounded in the view that if the Convention allowed
application of private international law, difficulties would arise
because of the divergent conflict rules in various legal systems.
However, the deletion of private international law led to the com-
plicated reservations made by ratifying states. The new Draft
Convention seeks to remedy this problem in Article One, stating:
(1) This Convention applies to contracts of sale of goods be-
tween parties whose places of business are in different States:
(a) when the States are Contracting States; or
(b) when the rules of private international law lead to the ap-
plication of the law of a Contracting State.
(2) The fact that the parties have their places of business in dif-
ferent States is to be disregarded whenever this fact does not
appear either from the contract or from any dealings between,
Countries ratifying by 1977 were Belgium, Gambia, Italy, the Netherlands, San Marino,
the United Kingdom, West Germany (ULIS and ULF) and Israel (ULIS only). Berman &
Kaufman, supra note 23, at 265. Of the nine countries that had ratified ULIS by 1981, none
were socialist, and only one was a developing country. Reczei, The Area of Operation of the
International Sales Convention, 29 AM. J. COMP. L. 513 (1981).
UNCITRAL, Report on the Eleventh Session 10-30 (1978); reprinted at 27 AM. J.
CoMP. L. 325-45 (1979). See also Honnold, The Draft Convention on Contracts for the Inter-
national Sale of Goods: An Overview, 27 AM. J. COMP. L. 223 (1979).
Draft Convention.
G. DELAUME, supra note 5, at 22.
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or from information disclosed by, the parties at any time before
or at the conclusion of the contract.
(3) Neither the nationality of the parties nor the civil or com-
mercial character of the contract is to be taken into considera-
tion in determining the application of this Convention.
That nations need not preclude use of their own law or use of any
other private international law makes the Draft Convention more
adaptable to current legal systems and more likely to be ratified
without troublesome reservations. But despite the improvements
of the Draft Convention, numerous problems must be overcome
before it will provide a workable solution to the international
codification of conflict of laws. Many private businesses in the
United States and elsewhere find it burdensome to keep up with
the new uniform laws, and speculate that the uniform laws were
negotiated in response to pressure from the developing world.'
Thus, the Conventions are understood as political instruments
rather than economically viable proposals for solving international
problems. As one commentator noted: "There is also a desire to in-
corporate in [international law] certain principles that have been
usually regarded in the West as political rather than legal and
that by their very generality and flexibility of application, lend
themselves to manipulation."62 In contrast, leaders of many
developing countries believe that the drafting of uniform law is
dominated by developed countries and that the resulting laws mis-
perceive needs of developing nations. Present at the 1981 Vienna
Conference on the Draft Convention, however, were many devel-
oping nations, including Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa
Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, and Uruguay, with Venezuela send-
ing an observer. 3 The representative from Yugoslavia stated:
[Tihe interests of the developing countries and the need for the
establishment of the new international economic order should be
The Group of 77, now 111 strong, was organized during the first United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in Geneva .... The aim of its
members was to involve their demands with greater authority by confronting the
industrialized countries with a compact group speaking with one voice. In many of
the Western countries, this was viewed in more ideological terms as a split be-
tween affluent democracies which put their faith in economic growth and the
Third World which wanted a redistribution of the world's wealth to poorer coun-
tries.
18 HARV. INTL L.J. 109 (1977).
62 Roffe, supra note 16, at 569.
' United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, U.N.
GAOR, Special Session, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 97/18 (1980).
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taken into consideration at the adoption of the final text at the
diplomatic Conference to be held in Vienna, so that the expecta-
tions of the developing countries could be met with regard to
the implementation of resolutions adopted at the sixth and sev-
enth special sessions of the General Assembly of the United Na-
tions, a fact of which account should be taken also by
UNCITRAL.6
Because expansive party autonomy prevails among developed
nations, contracting parties may select from a variety of legal sys-
tems. However, within this legal spectrum are choices that could
prove detrimental to North-South relations in certain situations.
From a purely economic perspective, the best choice may be lex
loci, as most businessmen would deem the choice of their own
domestic law to involve less risk and cost. Western businessmen
often suspect that the commercial laws of developing nations are
commercially restrictive and impermanent. Yet, such fears may
also mask the feelings of nationalism, isolationism, and ethnic
superiority, which have continually fueled North-South tensions.
A mutual determination of rules of international trade would
result not only in more favorable cost-benefit ratios, but also in a
true balancing of North-South interests in the vital areas of na-
tional security and development.
The Draft Convention on the International Sale of Goods is es-
pecially encouraging because it promotes all of the beneficial
aspects of party autonomy: (1) it does not hold the parties to one
legal system; (2) it does not allow national courts to show favor-
itism to their domestic law; yet, (3) it does alleviate distrust
toward the nascent legal systems of developing nations. All na-
tions should welcome the implementation of the Convention, since
it, more than any other available system of law, can be a means of
circumventing current conflict of laws problems.
IV. Summary and Conclusion
Multinational enterprises, operating in accordance with supply
and demand capitalism, rarely consider the long-term effects their
behavior may have on developing economies. Although United
6 Id. at 18. The same representative made a recommendation that the Draft Convention
include the provision on good faith and fair conduct previously deleted from the revised
version to further the goals of the new economic order. This clause should be included as it
is not a radical political statement and is a concept readily applied in United States and
most Western laws today. Id. at 19.
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States businesses seldom employ economic malice toward develop-
ing nations, their superior bargaining power is an economic fact of
life. Private enterprises often resort to a standardized form con-
tract in all international transactions -a contract that gives little
or no consideration to the laws and policies of developing nations.
Likewise, the United States Government differentiates little in its
contractual dealings with developed and developing nations, in-
sisting that United States law govern every transaction in case of
dispute. 5 The advantages are rather obvious: (1) certainty and
uniformity of results and (2) avoidance of expensive and inconveni-
ent foreign litigation.6 Although the interests of the sovereign"
differ somewhat from those of private business, it is difficult to
encourage private enterprises to adopt a course of conduct dif-
ferent from that which has proven so cost beneficial to the govern-
ment.
If the NIEO is to redress the developing Third world's other-
wise permanent economic disabilities, some legal systems more
equitable than those in current use must be employed to regulate
international commerce. An argument has been made that equity
and justice demand "income and wealth redistribution through
higher prices for developing country exports, systematic and
permanent trading preferences, automatic resource transfers and
debt relief, enlarged aid programs, preferential access to North-
ern technology, and unrestrained rights to discriminatory treat-
ment on expropriation of foreign investments." 8 Consideration of
developing nations' needs and policies in choice of law provisions
would be in keeping with these goals.
However, solutions to worldwide commercial and economic in-
equities are not found easily. Enterprises from developed nations
cannot be expected to follow the Draft Convention on the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods or to give preferential treatment to de-
veloping nations for reasons devoid of economic benefit. Perhaps
65 Gluck, Choice of Law and Forum in International Contracts, 11 PuB. CONT. L.J. 103,
118 (1979).
6 Id. at 117.
"It can be argued that the Government's best interests are always served by winning
its case and, therefore, that Government lawyers should invoke foreign law whenever that
law supports the Government's position better than U.S. law. United States law, however,
reflects congressional policy, which supposedly is the policy of the United States Govern-
ment. It might be somewhat incongruous, therefore, for a contracting agency which derives
its being and contracting authority from congressionally enacted statutes to renounce con-
gressional policies embodied in the substantive law." Id. at 118 n.57.
6 L. GORDON. supra note 1, at 18.
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the best that can be hoped for is a changed outlook in the business
community.
Because contact with foreign laws is admittedly burdensome for
private enterprise, 9 there should be "a legitimate interest in
establishment of internationally accepted jurisdictional
principles,"7 which would enable avoidance of conflicts. National
governments should be encouraged to surrender some of the his-
torical trappings of sovereignty in order "to integrate interna-
tional organizations or to form a more cooperative international
system."7 Only then can they credibly encourage private enter-
prise to follow suit. A significant beginning would be the inclusion
of fairly negotiated choice of law clauses in contracts linking
developed and developing nations.
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